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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine if Portuguese soccer' star Christiano Ronaldo was
not allowed to start for Manchester United ("Man Utd."), an English
club, in the 2008 Union of European Football Associations ("UEFA")
Champions League final match because of his nationality. His goal -
just twenty-six minutes into the match - might never have transpired,
which may have prevented his team from ultimately defeating
English rival Chelsea 1-1 (6-5).2 While the above hypothetical is
certainly extreme, it would be in the realm of possibilities if Federa-
tion Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA") President Sepp
Blatter has his way. Blatter's proposed "6+5" rule, which the 58th
FIFA Congress has overwhelmingly approved,3 simply states that,
"[a]t the beginning of each match, each club must field at least [six]
who are players eligible to play for the national team of the country
of the club."4 Though many prominent figures have offered their
support for the rule's objectives, 5 the rule contravenes certain estab-
lished principles of European Community ("EC" or "Community")
law.6 If that is the case, the rule, as it currently stands, would not be
1 This article uses the term "soccer" rather than the more widely used "football."
2 Soccerway.com, Chelsea vs. Manchester United, http://www.soccerway.com/
matches/2008/05/21 /europe/uefa-championsleague/chelsea-footballclub/manchester-
united-fc/616598/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
3 Media Release, FIFA, FIFA Congress Supports Objectives of 6+5 (May 30, 2008),
http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/bodies/media/newsid-783657.html
[hereinafter "FIFA Congress Supports Objectives"]. At its meeting in Sydney on
May 29 and 30, 2008, the FIFA Congress approved the measure with a significant
majority (155 yes, 5 no). Id
4 Id. In the above example, Ronaldo would clearly still be eligible for Man Utd.'s
starting lineup, despite being ineligible to play for the English national team. The
reference is only used to demonstrate that many of the game's most prominent clubs
could be without the services of key foreign players - which are so heavily relied
upon if the rule is deemed legal.
5 Former soccer "greats" Pele, Franz Beckenbauer, and Johann Cruyff have offered
support for FIFA's proposal. See, e.g., Vicki Hodges, FIFA Congress Backs
President Sepp Blatter Over '6+5' Foreign Quota Proposal, TELEGRAPH (UK), May
30, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/2301939/Fifa
Congress-backs-president-Sepp-Blatter-over-65- foreign-quota-proposal.html (last
visited Mar. 3, 2009).
6 The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957,
which created a common market under the premise that people, goods, and services
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applicable to the clubs of national associations based in Europ-ean
Union ("EU") Member States.
This note examines the legality of FIFA's proposed "6+5" rule
as it relates to the principles of antidiscrimination, the free movement
of workers, and basic elements of competition law elucidated in the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.7 Part II reviews the
history of important European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court")
decisions involving sports figures and the applicability of EC law.8
Part III lays out the present issues and analyzes whether the rule is in
opposition to, or can overcome, established Community law, which
the recent Institute of European Affairs ("INEA") report indicates is a
very realistic possibility. Part IV discusses possible solutions to the
be allowed to move freely across borders, and served as the legal basis for current
European Community law. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Econom-
ic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (as in effect 1957) [hereinafter
Treaty of Rome]. Commonly referred to as the EEC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome was
amended in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastrict, in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam, in
2001 by the Treaty of Nice, and in 2007 by the Treaty of Lisbon. EUROPA, The
History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/ 19451959/index en.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2009). The Treaty of Lisbon also renamed the EEC Treaty as
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Treaty of Lisbon Amending
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 1, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 10; see generally KAREN DAVIES, UNDER-
STANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW 7-24 (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) (2001).
7 Any reference to an Article within this paper is to the version of the EEC Treaty, as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 83) 47.
8 Though there is no doctrine of stare decisis in Community law, the ECJ tends to
decide cases consistent with its prior rulings. See Joel Vander Kooi, The Asean
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Doing it the "Asean Way, " 20 N.Y.
INT.'L L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2007) ("[T]he principle of binding precedent, or stare
decisis, has developed within the EC to a significant degree despite the silence of the
EC treaties on the subject."); see also CURIA, Court of Justice, Presentation,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2 7024/presentation (last visited May 10, 2009)
[hereinafter Presentation] (stating "[w]here a question referred for a preliminary
ruling is identical to a question on which the Court has already been called on to
rule, or where the answer to the question admits of no reasonable doubt or may be
clearly deduced from existing case-law, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate
General, give its decision by reasoned order, citing in particular a previous judgment
relating to that question or the relevant case-law.").
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quandary, including UEFA's "Homegrown Player" rule,9 and
explains why that rule has stronger legal standing than the "6+5"
rule under EC law. Finally, Part V concludes that FIFA is unlikely to
win its battle with the EU Commission given that the "6+5" rule
encroaches upon fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EC law and
surmises that a Bosman-like ruling1 ° could be forthcoming.
II. THE INGREDIENTS LEADING TO BOSMAN AND BEYOND
A. Sport as an Economic Activity and the Struggle to Enforce It
The discussion of Community law and sports in relation to
the ECJ dates back to 1974.11 In Walrave v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Inter-
nationale, the Court was faced with the question of whether sport falls
within the parameters of EC law.12 The ECJ answered this question
affirmatively, but with some restriction, as it held, "the practice of
sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty." 13
Only when the activity is of "purely sporting interest" can it escape
the scope of Articles 45-48 and 56-62 of the Treaty. 14 As a result,
9 UEFA is one of six soccer confederations in the world - which are considered
umbrella organizations of the national soccer associations on each continent and it
governs European soccer. A confederation can stage its own competitions at both the
club and international levels, such as the Champions League or UEFA Cup, and it
helps support FIFA, while still allowing the national associations to hold certain
rights. FIFA.com, Football Confederations, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/
federation/confederations/index.html (last visited May 9, 2009). UEFA also plays a
role in FIFA's administration, as it elects two FIFA vice presidents and five
members of FIFA's executive committee. EXEC. COMM. OF THE UNION OF EUR.
FOOTBALL Ass'NS, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF CONGRESS: REGULATIONS GOVERNING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATUTES, art. 19, § 4 (June 2007), available at
http://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/19081 .pdf.
10 See discussion infra Part l1.B.
I See Case 36/74, Walrave v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Int'l, 1974 E.C.R. 1-1405 (1974)
(challenging the legality of a Union Cycliste International rule requiring the
pacemaker and the stayer to be of the same nationality for cycling teams).
12 See RICHARD PARRISH, SPORTS LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 86
(Simon Bulmer ed., 2003).
13 Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1-1417.
14 Id. at 1-1418.
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national teams are permitted to discriminate based upon national-
ity.15 Additionally, the Court found that Articles 45 and 56 of the
Treaty carry horizontal direct effect, meaning nondiscrimination
principles apply to public authorities as well as any set of rules
designed to collectively regulate gainful employment and services.1 6
This last holding is of particular importance in relation to the "6+5"
rule because it means FIFA is not able to implement policies that
conflict with Community law.
Two years after its Walrave decision, the ECJ faced similar
sports-related issues. In Don v. Mantero,17 the Italian national court
asked the ECJ to decide whether Articles 18, 45, and 56 of the Treaty
accord EU nationals the right to provide a service anywhere within
the EU and, if so, whether that right applies to soccer players in the
nature of a gainful occupation. 8 The Court held that rules permitting
only the nationals of a State to participate in a professional or semi-
professional match are incompatible with the Articles in question,
"unless such rules or practices exclude foreign players from particip-
ation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such
matches and are thus of sporting interest only."'19 As some comment-
ators have noted, this decision created uncertainty as to what
constitutes "sporting interest only."20 Over three decades later, that
uncertainty has yet to be resolved, and the crux of the debate
concerning FIFA's "6+5" rule pertains to whether this broad excep-
tion from Walrave and Dona applies.
15 See id.
16 id.
17 Case 13/76, DonA v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333 (involving a challenge by an
agent to the Federazione Italiana del Gioco del Calcio ("FIGC") rules stating that
normally only soccer players of Italian nationality residing in Italy can be issued the
card required to be eligible to play within a league of the country).
18 PARRISH, supra note 12, at 87-88.
9 Domn, 1976 E.C.R. at 1341.
20 See Duncan McHardy, Reconciling Soccer Authorities and European Union
Institutions: Who is Best Placed to Administer Governance within the European
Soccer Market?, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 105, 123 (2008) (noting that
"the ECJ failed to define a competition of 'sporting interest only"').
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Despite the ECJ's rulings in Walrave and Dona, the European
Commission ("Commission") did not fully adhere to the principles
set forth in those cases.21 As such, the Commission and UEFA battled
over nationality restrictions for nearly two decades. In 1991, UEFA
implemented the "3+2" rule - an older cousin of FIFA's "6+5" rule -
which allowed each team participating in UEFA competitions to field
up to three foreign players plus two "assimilated" 22 foreign players.23
This new rule was a compromise with the Commission, as it did
away with the old system limiting the number of foreign players to
two, not including "assimilated foreign" players. 24
Though on the surface the "3+2" rule appears to have a dis-
criminatory feature much like the "6+5" rule, the Commission still
sought total freedom of movement at a later date.25 One possible
explanation for the Commission's relaxed position concerning
UEFA's rule is that, in 1991, European soccer could be regarded "as a
marginal economic activity at best."26 As soccer became more visible
on a global scale due to various telecommunications developments, 27
it could no longer be denied that soccer went beyond "purely sport-
ing interest." With the Commission and UEFA engaged in a two-
decade stalemate, the playing field was set for the ECJ to serve as
referee. All it needed was a banner case - a case that the European
Community and the rest of the world would take notice of - and it
got just that in the symbolic figure of Jean-Mark Bosman.
21 PARRISH, supra note 12, at 91.
22 An assimilated player is one who has played in a country for five straight years
without interruption, including at least three years on a junior team. Id. at 92.
23 See Lindsey Valaine Briggs, UEFA v The European Community: Attempts of the
Governing Body of European Soccer to Circumvent EU Freedom of Movement and
Antidiscrimination Labor La, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 439, 440-41 (2005).
24 See Rachel B. Arnedt, European Union Law and Football Nationality Restric-
tions: The Economics and Politics of the Bosman Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1091, 1104 (1998).
25 See PARRISH, supra note 12, at 92.
26 id.
27 See Michael Siebold & Angela Klingmfiller, Sports Facility Financing and
Development Trends in Europe and Germany 2003, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 75,
83 (2004) (noting that broadcasting rights are being packaged in a creative and
sophisticated manner, and include not only the broadcasts of live games, but also
video on demand, mobile telephones, and broadband Internet rights).
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B. Bosman: The Facts, The Results, and The Legal Ramifications
1. Who is Bosman?
Jean-Mark Bosman was a Belgian national playing for a
Belgian club, RC Liege, in a Belgian league governed by the Union
Royale Belge des Soci~t~s de Football Association ASBL ("URBSFA"),
whose contract was set to expire on June 30, 1990.28 Two months
prior, the club offered Bosman the minimum contract allowed under
URBSFA rules, at the rate of BFR 29 30,000 per month - a quarter of his
monthly salary for the current season.30 The offer was promptly
rejected, and Bosman was placed on the transfer list, as stipulated by
URBSFA rules, for a transfer fee of BFR 11,743,000. 31 The transfer fee
seemed to prevent other clubs from contacting RC Liege concerning
Bosman's availability, so Bosman became proactive and struck a deal
with US Dunkerque, a French second division team.32 The deal gave
the French club an irrevocable offer for full transfer contingent upon
URBSFA sending a transfer certificate to the FHderafion Fran~aise de
Football ("FFF") before the start of the season on August 2, 1990. 33 RC
Liege had doubts about the solvency of US Dunkerque and so did not
ask URBSFA to send the transfer certificate to the FFF.34 As a result,
the contract Bosman signed with the French club became void, and
RC Liege suspended him for the 1990-91 season in accordance with
URBSFA rules.35
28 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societ~s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5050.
29 "BFR" stands for Belgian Francs the Belgian form of currency before the
implementation of the Euro in 2002.
30 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-5050.
3 id.
32 id.
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Bosman filed for relief in the Belgian courts, and eventually
the case was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.36 The two
main issues brought before the Court were: (1) whether Articles 45,
101, and 102 of the Treaty37 prohibit a transfer fee when a player
signs with a new club upon the completion of his contract, and (2)
whether national and international sporting associations can restrict
access to foreign players within the EU from the competitions which
they organize. 38
2. Justifications Denied
Concerning the first question, the ECJ held that, "Article [451
... precludes the application of rules.., under which a professional
footballer who is a national of one Member State may not, on the
expiry of his contract... be employed by a club of another Member
State unless the latter club has paid to the former club a transfer...
fee." 39 The Court noted the transfer system does not protect against
the richest clubs securing the best players and does not prevent fin-
ancial resources from being a crucial factor in sports.40 Additionally,
the Court found that the need to develop and maintain young players
as a result of the transfer system does have validity, but that there is
too much uncertainty for it to serve as an overriding justification.41
As to the second question, the ECJ concluded, "that Article
[451 of the Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by
sporting associations under which, in matches in competitions which
they organize, football clubs may field only a limited number of
36 See id at 1-5051 to -55; see also Amikam Omer Kranz, The Bosman Case: The
Relationship Between European Union Law and the Transfer System in European
Football, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 431, 436-37 (1999).
37 Article 45(2) states: "[s]uch freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment."
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 7, at 66. Articles 101
and 102 both pertain to rules on competition and rules applicable to undertakings.
See id. arts. 101 -102.
38 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-5056.39 1d. at 1-5073.
40 Id. at 1-5071 to -72.
41 Id. at 1-5072.
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professional players who are nationals of other Member States." 42
The Court rejected the defendants' tendered justifications and noted
that being a foreign player does not preclude one from playing for his
or her country's national team.43 Furthermore, the Court stated that
Article 45 gives workers a greater chance of finding employment in
other Member States 44; that nationality clauses do not prevent the
richest clubs from securing the services of the best domestic players 45;
and that the Commission does not have the power to authorize
practices which are contrary to the Treaty.46 Finally, the Court found
that because the two referred questions are contrary to Article 45, it
was unnecessary to rule on the interpretations of Articles 101 and 102
of the Treaty. 47
3. The ECJ's Decision: Opportunities for Future Challenge?
The Bosnian ruling had several temporal effects, both in
present and future scope. Of immediate relevance, Bosman did not
affect transfers of non-EU nationals from one EU Member State to
another; it applied to all sports48 in EU Member States that placed
restrictions on nationals; and it did not affect the composition of
national teams.49 In terms of having a lasting impact, the decision
imparted that, not only do nationality restrictions constitute discrimi-
nation, but they also serve as an obstacle to free movement in terms
of access to the employment market.50 This is of particular signifi-
cance because it potentially broadens the scope of sporting rules that
42 1d. at 1-5078.
41 Id. at 1-5077.
44 Defendants argued that opening up the employment market to nationals of other
Member States would reduce workers' chances of finding employment within the
Member State for which they are nationals. Id.
45 Defendants argued nationality clauses prevent the wealthiest clubs from constantly
outbidding each other for the best foreign talent. Id
46 Defendants cited the Commission's approval of versions of the "3+2" rule in
support of the legality of nationality restrictions. Id at 1-5078.
47 id.
48 Examples include ice hockey, basketball, handball, volleyball, and rugby.
49 See PARRISH, supra note 12, at 98.
50 See id at 99.
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can fall within Article 45's range.51 As one scholar states, "rather than
'contracting into the Treaty, sport must justify why it should 'con-
tract' out of it."52
Perhaps the most striking concept taken from the decision,
however, is the Court's implicit acknowledgement that sport can be
separated from other industries if proper justification is given.53
While the ECJ analyzed the justifications raised by the defendants, it
held they were not strong enough to outweigh the Treaty princi-
ples. 54 It did give special recognition to the argument that transfer
fees encourage clubs to seek new talent and to develop young players
but used words such as "contingent" and "uncertain" when describ-
ing its effects. 55 The crucial point to note is that the Court did not
explain what justifications could be sufficient to overcome EC law.
The opinion of Advocate General Carl Otto Lenz provides
further insight into what justifications may be strong enough to over-
come the stringent balancing test.56 First, Advocate General Lenz
noted that the Court has since expanded its holdings from Walrave
and Don to potentially include economic justifications that are in the
general interest of the Community. 57 Taking this into consideration,
however, the transfer rules, as implemented, were unnecessary to
achieve the legitimate aim of maintaining competitive balance within
the professional leagues, as there were less restrictive means of
achieving economic and sporting equilibrium among the clubs.58
51 See id.
52 id.
53 See Stephen Weatherill, Resisting the Pressures qf 'Americanization': The
Influence of European Community Law, on the 'European Sport Model, ' in LAW AND
SPORT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 155, 164 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds.,
2000).
54 Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societ~s de Football Ass'n ASBL v.
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5081.
55 See id. at 1-5071 to -72.
56 See id. at 1-5012 to -25 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
57 See id. at 1-5013; see also Case C-300/90, Comm'n v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. I-
305, 1-320, 1-321 (holding restrictions on freedom of movement can be lawful if
necessary to ensure cohesion of the tax system).
58 See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-5017 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz) (arguing
there could be limits agreed upon to control the upward spiral of player salaries, and
there could be greater wealth distribution between clubs that generate higher
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Stated differently, "[t]he transfer rules are [ ] not indispensable for
attaining that objective, and thus do not comply with the principle of
proportionality."59
In addressing the argument that transfer fees serve as com-
pensation for costs incurred in the training and development of
players, Advocate General Lenz remained unconvinced. 60 He opined
that the fees are associated with a player's earnings as opposed to
team start-up costs and that high fees are exchanged even when
experienced players change clubs.61 Advocate General Lenz did
propose, however, that transfer fees might be justifiable if two condi-
tions are met: "[flirst, the transfer fee would actually have to be
limited to the amount expended by the previous club (or previous
clubs) for the player's training[;] [slecond, a transfer fee would come
into question only in the case of a first change of clubs where the
previous club had trained the player." 62 Unlike the Court, Advocate
General Lenz lent more insight into what actions could be considered
justifiable to overcome Treaty principles. 63 Nevertheless, he still
stopped short of listing specific criteria, leaving the door open for
more challenges to come.
C. Bosman's Progeny
In response to Bosman, the ECJ began to narrow the broad
relationship it had established between Article 45 and sport ever so
slightly. 64 In particular, there were two major cases, both of which
tended to be more favorable to sports governing bodies. In Deliege v.
Asbl Ligue Francophone de Judo,65 a Belgian judoka claimed that her
revenues and those disadvantaged in smaller markets - neither of which run afoul
from freedom of movement principles).59 Id. at 1-5020 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
60 Id. at 1-5021 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
61 See id
62 Id. at 1-5022 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
63 See generally id at 1-5012 to -25 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
64 Andreas Joklik, The Legal Status of Professional Athletes: Differences Between
the United States and the European Union Concerning Free Agency, 11 SPORTS
LAW. J. 223, 252 (2004).
65 Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97, Delihge v. Ligue Francophone de Judo, 2000
E.C.R. 1-2549.
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career had been hindered by the country's judo governing body in
that the government refused to let her participate in the 1992 and
1996 Olympic Games. 66 The issues presented were: (1) whether she
needed to be authorized by a federation to compete in a high-level
international event, and (2) whether the denial of this notion violated
Article 5667 of the Treaty. 68 The Court held that, "[a] rule.., does not
in itself, as long as it derives from a need inherent in the organisation
of such a competition, constitute a restriction on the freedom to
provide services prohibited by Article 56 of the EC Treaty." 69 Based
on this principle, FIFA would merely need to show that the "6+5"
rule protects elements of competition.
Delige is significant because it shows that selection criteria do
not necessarily impose restrictions under Article 56.70 Similarly,
Lehtonen v. Federation Royale Belge des Socijtes de Basket-ball ASBL also
demonstrates potential sporting exceptions to Treaty law.71 In
Lehtonen, the Belgian basketball federation refused to register
Lehtonen, a transfer player from a Finnish league, because the trans-
action did not take place within the specified transfer window. 72 As a
result, Lehtonen was ineligible to play for his new team. 73 The ECJ
was called upon to determine whether "the rules of a sports federa-
tion which prohibit a club from playing a player in the competition
for the first time if he has been engaged after a specified date [are]
contrary to the Treaty of Rome (in particular Articles [18, 45, 101 and
1021).... ."74 The Court found the rule operated to restrict free move-
ment of workers even though it had more to do with participation
than employment. 75 Despite this assertion, the Court agreed with the
66 See id. at 1-2602.
67 Article 56 governs the free movement of services. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at
149.
68 See Deti~ge, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-2612.
69 Id. at 1-2620.
70 See PARRISH, supra note 12, at 104; see also Joklik, supra note 64, at 250-52.
71 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen v. F~d~ration Royale Belge des Soci~t~s de Basketball
ASBL, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2681,1-2682 to -83.
72 See id. at 1-2721 to -22.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 1-2723 to -24.
71 Id. at 1-2732 to -33.
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defendants that the rules on transfer deadlines were necessary for the
organization of the game, reasoning that the regulations protect
against drastically altering a team in the course of the champion-
ship. 76 In condoning this justification, the Court was careful to point
out that such rules must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the desired aim.77 Once again, this case serves as an example that
justifications to Treaty exceptions can work if they can be classified as
non-economic sporting interests. This is the challenge FIFA faces as it
takes on EC law.
D. The ECJ Finally Tackles Articles 101 and 102... Sort of
Throughout the previously discussed cases, the ECJ analyzed
the issues raised primarily using an Article 45 framework, with the
free movement of workers and antidiscrimination at the forefront.78
A common theme evolved in relation to Articles 101 and 102 in that
the Court refused to decide the cases based on competition law prin-
ciples. 79 In 2006, the Court finally addressed the issue in the sporting
context.80
In Meca-Medina, two professional swimmers who tested
positive for the banned substance nandrolone challenged their
resulting suspensions by the Fd~ration Internationale de Natation
("FINA"), swimming's international governing body, on the theory
that the disciplinary action infringed upon their right to compete. 81
The athletes did not object to the sporting objectives 82 of the anti-
doping rules; instead, they argued that the rules had an underlying
economic component designed to protect the International Olympic
Committee's interests and were therefore excessive by nature.83 By
76 1d. at 1-2734.
77 See id.; see also Joklik, supra note 64, at 249-52.
78 See discussion supra Parts I.B-C.
79 id.
80 See Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6991.8! See id. at 1-7009 to -11.
82 The objectives "included the need to safeguard equal chances for athletes, athletes'
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virtue of being excessive, the rules lost their "sporting interest only" 84
status and were no longer exempt from falling within the jurisdiction
of Article 101.85
The Court began by framing the competition analysis under
Articles 101 and 102, noting, "it will be necessary to determine ...
whether the rules which govern that activity emanate from an
undertaking, whether the latter restricts competition or abuses its
dominant position, and whether that restriction or that abuse affects
trade between Member States." 86 Even though the Court set forth this
foundation, it did not need to fully apply these factors; the athletes
did not supply scientific evidence to support their claim that the level
of nandrolone in one's system deemed prohibitory was too low to be
considered fully accurate. 87 As such, the athletes' claims were dis-
missed,88 but not before the Court was able to throw a bit of a wrinkle
into its "purely sporting interest" discussions from previous cases.89
The Court declared that rules implemented with a purely
sporting interest in mind can still be challenged under the Treaty if
they are not proportionate to the desired goal.90 As the Court stated,
"in order not to be covered by the prohibition laid down in Article
[101(1)], the restrictions [ ] imposed by those rules must be limited to
what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive
sport."91 Though this reasoning is similar to the Court's Article 45
analysis, it stands out because, for the first time, the Court confirmed
that sporting rules will face heavy scrutiny when a challenge under
Article 101, and seemingly Article 102, has been raised. Additionally,
this means a rule could conceivably satisfy the sporting interest
criterion for purposes of free movement law but not pass muster
84 See discussion supra Part II.A.
85 See Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. at 1-7024.
86 Id. at 1-7020.
87 See id. at 1-7024 to -26.
88 See id. at 1-7026 to -27.
89 See Hayden Opie, Survey: A Global Perspective on the Most Important Cases
Affecting the Sports Industry, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 116 (2009).
90 See Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. at 1-7024.
9 Id.
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under competition law.92 Should a rule such as the anti-doping proce-
dures in Meca-Medina be challenged, the sporting organization will
have to show that the rule necessary, that it is not excessive, and that
it does not produce adverse effects on competition. Consequently,
this makes it more difficult for a rule-making body to bring about
change 93 and is yet another obstacle facing FIFA regarding the "6+5"
rule.
Subsequent to Meca-Medina, the ECJ was scheduled to rule on
another potentially groundbreaking case concerning the free move-
ment of goods, the free movement of services, and competition law.94
In SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi v. Fderation Internationale de
Football Ass'n Charleroi, a Belgian soccer club filed suit against FIFA
after one of its players was injured while playing for the Moroccan
national team.95 The club claimed FIFA's rule requiring teams to
release players for international competitions was violative of the
Treaty and so sought compensation for missing one of its key players
92 See GIANNI INFANTINO, UEFA, MECA-MEDINA: A STEP BACKWARDS FOR THE
EUROPEAN SPORTS MODEL AND THE SPECIFICITY OF SPORT? 7 (2006), http://www.
uefa.com/multimediafiles/download/uefa/keytopics/480391 download.pdf.
93 See, e.g., id. at 2 (lamenting that, based on the precise language of the Court's
ruling in Meca-Medina, "it is now more difficult to identify specific sports rules that
are not capable of challenge under EU law").
94 In SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi v. Fidiration Internationale de Football
Association, the question referred to the Court was as follows: "Do the obligations
on clubs and football players having employment contracts with those clubs imposed
by the provisions of FIFA's statutes and regulations providing for the obligatory
release of players to national federations without compensation and the unilateral
and binding determination of the coordinated international match calendar constitute
unlawful restrictions of competition or abuses of a dominant position or obstacles to
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms conferred by the EC Treaty and are they
therefore contrary to Articles 81 and 82 [amended as Articles 101 and 102] of the
Treaty or to any other provision of Community law, particularly Articles 39 and 49
[amended as Articles 45 and 56, respectively] of the Treaty?" Case C-243/06, SA
Sporting du Pays de Charleroi v. F1dration Int'l de Football Ass'n, 2006 O.J. (C
212) 11, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-OJ:C:
2006:212:0011:0011 :EN:PDF).
95 See Raf Casert, Despite FIFA Club Compensation Deal, Charleroi Maintains
Landmark Court Case, AP WORLDSTREAM, Feb. 13, 2008, available at WL,
APWORLD 15:03:45.
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and for his medical expenses.96 Before the ECJ could rule on the
legality of the rule, the two sides reached a general settlement in
which clubs will receive approximately £2,800 for each day one of
their players is involved in an international tournament.97
There are several reasons why the case might have settled;
specifically, FIFA may have considered the Court's trend of narrow-
ing the sporting exception and decided the current status of the rule
should not be left to chance. Charleroi demonstrates that FIFA is
potentially willing to compromise when it comes to contro-versial
rules, which ultimately may be FIFA's best play in trying to imple-
ment the "6+5" rule.
E. Laying the Foundation
Thus far, the case studies in this article have demonstrated
that sport falls within the precipice of EC law, and that certain non-
economic, and potentially economic, reasons can override Treaty
principles. Nevertheless, it is yet to be clearly established what fac-
tors may be strong enough to overcome these principles, though the
burden appears to be high. Faced with such uncertainty, the legal
battle over the "6+5" rule has been formulated. Now, the primary
issues in play are: (1) whether the rule violates Articles 45, 101, and
102 of the Treaty; (2) whether justifications based on some combina-
tion of reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality can be offered
if the rule is deemed in violation; and (3) whether those justifications
are strong enough to overcome established Treaty law.
Ill. ASSESSING THE RULE'S LEGALITY
A. The Arguments
1. The Treaty of Lisbon
With the rise of sport on a global and economic level, there
has been much debate in the EU as to whether it can be regulated
96 See id.
97 See Gary Jacob, United and Real Head for Meeting, TIMES (LONDON), July 7,
2008, at 2.
V. 17
(F)LINGING (I)NDISPENSABLE (F)REEDOMS (A)SIDE
under Treaty law as if it is just another industry.98 The ECJ has
consistently found that sport is not above the basic freedoms ensured
to all EU citizens,99 but there is growing support in the Community
that this position is softening. 100 The Treaty of Lisbon is what FIFA is
using as a basis for the "6+5" rule's legality.10 1 As Blatter has explain-
ed, "'[wie do not want to go against the existing laws. Regarding
Europe, we want to use the legal basis of the Treaty of Lisbon, which
acknowledges the specificity of sport and its structures and organisa-
tions, and comes into force on 1 January 2009."'102
While Blatter's initial assessment of the rule's legal founda-
tion seems rational and could garner support,10 3 problems can still be
anticipated. Even though the Treaty of Lisbon has now entered into
force, 10 4 it is still unclear - based on the broad language of the
Articles - how it would relate to other aspects of established Com-
munity law or what, and how much, authority it gives to sports gov-
erning bodies. Given such uncertainty, Blatter's reliance on the Treaty
98 See Markku Laitinen & Tiinu Wuolio, European Constitutional Treaty to Include
Sports, MOTION - SPORTS IN FINLAND, Jan. 2003, at 28, available at http://www.Its.
fi/filearc/355 28 European Constitutional.pdf?LTS regtqjcsor4anl8rmuv6o89dk3
507 (quoting Erkki Liikanen, a member of the European Commission, as saying,
"[s]port has to respect the law just as other economic or social activities do," but
also, "[s]port is of major interest for citizens in general[;] [i]t can be compared to
culture and education").
99 See, e.g, Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6991, 1-7018
(stating "[s]port is subject to community law in so far as it constitutes an economic
activity within the meaning of Art. 2 EC").
'00 See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 2, 124, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306/1) 82, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-
OJ:C:2007:306:0042:0133:EN:PDF ("The Union shall contribute to the promotion
of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its
structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function").
101 See FIFA Congress Supports Objectives, supra note 3.
102 id.
103 See, e.g., Sports:. Ministers Tackle FIFA 6+5 Rule, EUR. SOC. POL'Y, Dec. 8,
2008 (mentioning French Minister Bernard Laporte's strong backing of sport being a
separate EU competency within the Treaty of Lisbon).
104 EUROPA, Treaty of Lisbon, Taking Europe into the 21st Century, http:/europa.
eu/lisbon treaty/index en.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2010).
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of Lisbon for the "6+5" rule is at best premature, and at worst overly
speculative.
2. The Commission's Stance
In response to the mounting questions concerning the speci-
ficity of sport and sport's growing social, cultural, and economic
influence within the EU, the European Commission drafted a White
Paper to discuss these issues. 105 Regarding player quotas, the White
Paper concluded:
Rules requiring that teams include a certain
quota of locally trained players could be accepted as
being compatible with the Treaty provisions on free
movement of persons if they do not lead to any direct
discrimination based on nationality and if possible
indirect discrimination effects resulting from them
can be justified as being proportionate to a legitimate
objective pursued, such as to enhance and protect the
training and development of talented young players.
The ongoing study on the training of young sports-
men and sportswomen in Europe will provide
valuable input for this analysis. 10 6
Since the White Paper's publication, the Commission has come out
swinging against the "6+5" rule.10 7 Vladimir Spidla, the Commis-
sioner for Employment and Social Affairs, stated, "[t]he European
Commission is showing a red card to the six plus five rule. This
would be direct discrimination on the basis of nationality, which is
unacceptable. It's a non-starter."'108 Given that the "6+5" rule is based
on nationality, FIFA is facing an insurmountable obstacle in relation
105 Commission White Paper on Sport, COM 2007 (391) final (July 11, 207),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/doc/wp on sport en.pdf.
I6 ld. § 2.3.107 See George Caulkin, Sepp Blatter's Quota System Given "Red Card," TIMES
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to direct discrimination. Alternatively, its best course of action is to
argue that, even if indirect discrimination exists, the objectives are
proportionately justifiable for the good of the game.
3. Proffered Justifications
When passing the "6+5" resolution, FIFA stressed that soccer
is predicated on finding a balance between supporting national and
club teams.10 9 As a result, the rule is needed to protect against finan-
cial inequalities in soccer associations worldwide, to help ensure
competitiveness, and to promote the game's development. 10 In
particular, FIFA has stated that "[siafeguarding (i) the education and
training of young players, (ii) training clubs, and (iii) the values of
effort and motivation in football, particularly for young players, is a
fundamental element of protecting national teams and restoring
sporting and financial balance to club football.""1 While these
justifications may be strong enough to fit within the "purely sporting
interest" classification, it does not necessarily follow that the rule is
valid under EC law. Even if FIFA can get around issues concerning
direct discrimination, it still must show that the justifications cannot
be accomplished by less obtrusive means. 112 Therein lies another
challenge for soccer's governing body, especially as the larger and
more powerful teams have sought to throw their weight behind the
status quo. 113
B. The INEA Report
Even if a group supports the objectives of the "6+5" rule, the
general position is that such support is conditioned upon the rule
109 FIFA Congress Supports Objectives, supra note 3.
110 See id
111 Id.
112 See generally supra Part II.B.
113 See, e.g., Matt Hughes, Peter Kenyon Defends Dominance of 'Big Four,' TIMES
(UK), July 29, 2008 (quoting Chelsea's chief executive Peter Kenyon as stating,
"'[w]e don't support 'six plus five' and I don't think there is any appetite for it
across Europe. It will not solve the problem. We shouldn't dumb down and use
artificial ways to get an even platform."'), available at http://www.timesonline.co.
uk/tol/sport/football/premier league/chelsea/article4419168.ece.
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complying with Community law.114 In response to the current
dilemma, INEA 115 set out to examine whether the "6+5" rule can
overcome the Commission's wrath. By ultimately deciding that
FIFA's grand plan is legal,116 INEA's report has become the first
prominent authority, outside of FIFA, to reach such a conclusion.117 It
bears mentioning that the INEA report may be of controversial
scholarly value given its inherent bias, despite contrary assertions
from the organization itself. The group has been known to engage in
legal lobbying and was essentially hired by FIFA as an expert witness
to help prove its case. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to analyze the
rationales used in the report and to examine how they hold up
against the ECJ cases discussed in Part II of this article, for those are
arguments that FIFA relies upon as well.
114 See Hodges, supra note 5 (quoting then-chief executive of the English Football
Association, Brian Barwick, as saying, "[c]ertainly, we can understand the general
principle of a further exploration, but we are keen exponents of things staying within
domestic and international law").
115 INEA is an "ideational organization" consisting of professors and scientists, both
political and social. See Institute for European Affairs, Tasks and Goals,
http://www.inea-online.com/index.php?option-com content&task-section&id-3&
Itemid-13&lang-english (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). Founded in 1995, the Institute
"initiate[s] conferences, ambassador forums and discussion circles, deliberate[s] on
the themes of future events and provide[s] content impetus." Id. Its objective is "to
achieve a greater European convergence and a greater familiarity among European
leadership personalities, and ... to avoid or alleviate emerging or already existing
problems and tensions among European partners." Id. Furthermore, the Institute
claims "[a] successful change of EU law, e. g[.], the so-called EU-Legal-Lobbying,
is attributable to our repute." Institute for European Affairs, Locations, http://www.
inea-online.com/index.php?option-com content&task-section&id-4&ltemid 14
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
116 See INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, EXPERT OPINION ON THE COMPATIBILITY
OF THE "6+5 RULE" WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 184 (2009) [hereinafter
"INEA REPORT"], available at http://www.inea-online.com/index.php?option-com
content&task-view&id-35&ltemid-1.
117 Of note, the INEA Report was commissioned by FIFA. Simon Johnson, Boost for
Blatter in his Plan to Cut Foreign Invasion, EVENING STANDARD (LONDON, UK),
Feb. 26, 2009. INEA claims the study was completely independent and not dictated
by its client. INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 5.
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1. Direct Discrimination, Indirect Discrimination, or No
Discrimination?
The report provides an overview of its discrimination
analysis by questioning whether the "6+5" rule can even be governed
by Article 45 because "it is not a commercially motivated rule; [it] is
merely a sporting rule."1 18 It then proceeds to favorably compare the
"6+5" rule with other soccer rules, such as the basic rule that a club is
to field eleven players at the start of each match, and argues that the
"6+5" rule similarly governs the proportions of players in the starting
lineup.11 9 Next, it points out that the rule only applies at the start of
each match, and that a team may liberally use substitutions to
essentially end the game in a "3+8" situation, with the latter number
being the number of players ineligible for the national team of the
Member State in which the club is based. 120 From an ideological
perspective, the report interprets Article 45's broad exceptions to
entail that "sports associations are entitled to regulate in the area of
sport."121 Finally, the report cautions against using Bosman as a basis
for defeating the "6+5" rule because new problems affecting soccer
on an international level have developed, 122 which call for new, alter-
native remedies. 123 As the report frames it, " [in general, the error of
taking the existing case law of the European Court of Justice as an
absolute certainty when it comes to interpreting European comm-
unity law should be avoided."124
118 INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 64. To justify this assertion, the report further
states that "[i]n professional sport, commercial activity is merely the basis for
sporting investment and so indirectly for sporting success - it is just a means to an
end." Id.
119 Id
120 Id. at 64-65.
121 Id. at 67.
122 See id at 47. Among the listed problems include a drastic spike in the number of
foreign players within UEFA leagues, which has augmented the competitive
advantages that perennially more economically powerful clubs usually enjoy, and
the concomitant declines in the development of junior team players and the quality
of national team play. See id.
123 See id at 67-68.
1241d. at 68.
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In evaluating the INEA report's Article 45 analysis, the most
startling aspect is what little regard it gives to prior ECJ decisions
relating to the subject matter. While it broadly asserts that case law
"regarding fundamental freedoms is generally causing ever increas-
ing disquiet within member states," 125 it fails to connect that state-
ment to the specific views of the Member States in response to
the"6+5" rule, or to actually protrude deeply into the reasoning
behind the Bosnian line of cases. This is a necessary step because the
Court is the institution in charge of interpreting Community law,
including fundamental freedoms, and making sure the other institu-
tions, along with the Member States, do what the law requires. 126 If
the authors had properly gone through this process in detail, they
would have found that, despite occasional inconsistencies and ambi-
guous language, sport has long been regarded as falling within the
jurisdiction of EC law if an action falls outside the "purely sporting
interest" confines. Though the INEA report claims the rule meets this
exception, closer scrutiny reveals that is not necessarily the case.
One of the justifications the report cites in favor of the "6+5"
rule is that the regulation would mitigate the growing economic
divide between the clubs able to spend lavishly on free agents and
those without the availability of such resources, and in turn would
produce more competitive leagues.127 This rationale tends to weaken
the claim that the rule is designed to fit the "purely sporting interest"
standard. Admittedly, the Court has been vague about what the
criteria are for this standard,128 but under a literal application of the
standard, the rule does not seem to measure up. Essentially, the
report claims the "6+5" rule is not commercially motivated;129 yet,
one of the justifications for the rule is based on economic factors and
commercial inequalities.130 INEA offers no explanation for this
125 id.
126 See EUROPA, The Court of Justice, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/
index en.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009) (providing an overview of the ECJ's tasks
and functions).
121 See INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 37-3 8.
128 See discussion supra Part II.A.
129 INEA Report, supra note 116, at 64.
30 See FIFA Congress Supports Objectives, supra note 3.
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apparent paradox, and attempts to create a hybrid standard by
watering down the "purely sporting interest" definition to include a
mix of economic factors.13' Furthermore, in determining if the
Walrave and Don? holdings apply, it is not the "motivation" behind a
rule that serves as the dispositive factor, but rather the application of
the rule and determining its effects. 132 Using a criminal law analogy,
to hold otherwise would place a disproportionate emphasis on the
nimens rca (intent) requirement when the actus reus (result) requirement
is an equally important element to prove a crime. Thus, the basis for
the "6+5" rule is heavily intertwined with both sport and economic
factors, making it far from clear that the "purely sporting interest"
exception to EC law can even be applied.
Given the reservations in deeming the "6+5" rule as a "purely
sporting interest" rule, the next step is to scrutinize whether the rule
discriminates against players who do not meet the necessary criteria
required to be eligible for the national team of the Member State in
which the league is based. Under EC law, it is illegal to use
nationality as a basis for discrimination.133 There are two main types
of discrimination - direct and indirect.134 Direct discrimination can be
defined as a situation, "'where one person is treated less favourably
than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situa-
tion on grounds of [sex, racial, or ethnic origin]."' 135 Nationality can
easily be inserted within this definition based on Articles 18 and 45 of
the Treaty. 136 Indirect discrimination can be defined as "the imposi-
tion of national rules that are more easily satisfied by nationals than
by migrant workers." 137 One key difference between the two forms is
131 See McHardy, supra note 20.
132 See PARRISH, supra note 12.133 Article 18 of the EEC Treaty states: "[w]ithin the scope of application of this
Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited." Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, supra note 7, at 56.
134 See generally EVELYN ELLIS, EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 88-91 (Francis G.
Jacobs ed., 2005).
135 Id at 90 (quoting the near-identical definitions used in the Equal Treatment
Directive, the Race Directive, and the Framework Directive, respectively).
136 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 7, art.18.
137 DAVIES, supra note 6, at 109.
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that certain justifications may be cited to overcome indirect discrimi-
nation, whereas the same does not hold true for direct discrimina-
tion.138
Focusing on direct discrimination first, the INEA report finds
that the "6+5" rule does not violate this fundamental right.1 39 In
reaching this conclusion, the report reasons that the "6+5" rule only
governs the start of a game and therefore does not affect a team's
ability to sign foreign players.1 40 It then goes on to state that players
included in a starting lineup to meet the rule's requirements can be
substituted at any time.1 41 Accordingly, "the rule only concerns the
manner in which games are played and does not directly affect the
employability and contract terms of a newly recruited player."142
Not only is the INEA report's analysis on this section
incorrect, but it blatantly disregards ECJ case law. In Bosman, the
defendants tried to argue that player quotas only affect the players
involved in the match and that clubs are still free to sign as many
foreign players as they choose.143 The Court emphatically rejected
this contention, as it held:
The fact that those clauses concern not the employ-
ment of such players, on which there is no restriction,
but the extent to which their clubs may field them in
official matches is irrelevant. In so far as participation
in such matches is the essential purpose of a profes-
138 See id. at 137; see also Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 1-4197 to -98 (holding "that
national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil [sic] four conditions: they must be
applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative
requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment
of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary
in order to attain it").
139 See INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 102.
140 id.
141 See id at 103.
142 Id.
143 See Union Royale Belge des Societ~s de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995
E.C.R. 1-4921,1-5073 to -74.
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sional player's activity, a rule which restricts that
participation obviously also restricts the chances of
employment of the player concerned. 144
It is logical to assume clubs will only invest in players who can help
them win, especially given the economic benefits and prestige that
accompany success. Whether it is due to injury, ineligibility, or char-
acter concerns, if a player cannot fully participate in a match, it
directly impacts his chance of obtaining employment. The INEA
report has failed to make this inference, and its argument falls short
as a result. While it is true that a club is free to substitute its domestic
players in favor of foreign players after the match has begun,145 this is
still a direct limitation because a maximum of three substitutions per
side are allowed in a FIFA-regulated match.146 Based on the limited
amount of substitutions, each move is magnified and must be care-
fully weighed in light of fatigue, injury, strategy, and situational
concerns. Consequently, the rule not only affects players at the start
of a match, but also in terms of management's decision to keep them
on the roster. Thus, the rule has a strong correlation to a player's
employment status and constitutes direct discrimination.
2. Indirect Discrimination and the Proportionality Test
Even though there is a strong likelihood that the "6+5" rule
results in direct discrimination and cannot be overcome unless it
meets the "purely sporting interest" guidelines, it is still necessary to
analyze its impact in terms of indirect discrimination. The INEA
report argues that "no players are discriminated against at the time of
being hired" and "[alt most, this constitutes an indirect discrimi-
nation . '. ..147 As the Gebhard court broadly asserted, certain justifica-
tions can overcome indirect discrimination.148 Balancing procedures
144 Id. at 1-5074 to -75.
145 See FIFA Congress Supports Objectives, supra note 3.
146 FED'N INT'L DE FOOTBALL ASS'N, LAWS OF THE GAME 15 (July 2008), available
at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/federation/81/42/36/lotg en.pdf.
147 See INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 103.
148 See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165. It is important to note that Gebhard pertains to
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were also used in Bosman, but the ECJ did not feel the justifications
were strong enough to override the discrimination caused by player
quotas. 149 Accordingly, the successful adoption of the "6+5" rule
could depend on the overall strength of the justifications and whe-
ther they can overcome the restrictions imposed.
As the INEA Reports indicates, "[t]he sole purpose of the '6+5
rule' is to balance the competitive strength of associations without
restricting their economic freedom in terms of the employment and
training of players."' 50 Inherent in this notion is the idea that, if the
clubs with greater financial resources continually raise the price of
acquiring the best players, clubs relying primarily on the develop-
ment of regional junior players for success will be priced out of the
market. The report cites the Cassis formula1 51 as a guide for overcom-
ing indirect discrimination, 152 which is similar in concept to the
Gebhard factors listed above. In using these cases as a model, the
crucial point is that the justifications must be sufficient to overcome a
potential violation of fundamental freedoms, and they must be pro-
portional (i.e., "suitable," "necessary," and "adequate" to achieve the
proffered goals).153 The INEA Report recognizes this significance, and
acknowledges that "[w]hether or not the concrete measure really is
justified must, according to any dogmatic approach that may be
taken, ultimately be measured by its proportionality, i.e. by establish-
ing whether or not a balanced relation between ends and means
exists." 154
Having formulated the dichotomy between justification and
proportionality, it is entirely possible that one can occur without the
other, but this does not change the fact that both are needed to over-
come indirect discrimination. The justifications set forth by FIFA and
measures implemented by Member States. See id As such, the holding does not
directly apply to FIFA; however, the elements of indirect discrimination can still be
used as a guide.
149 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
150 INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 104.
151 See Case C-388/01, Comm'n v. Italian Republic (Cassis), 2003 E.C.R. 1-721, 1-
739 to -42.
152 See INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 137.
153 Id. at 142.
154 Id. at 141.
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reinforced by the INEA Report seem entirely plausible in theory and
appear to have the best interests of the game in mind. Sport is unlike
any other business model because it thrives on competition, rather
than seeking to destroy it.155 Thus, "balanc[ing] the competitive
strength of associations" 156 certainly promotes more fan interest both
locally and globally, as certain clubs are not necessarily unofficially
eliminated from championship contention prior to the start of the
season. Furthermore, developing young talent is a way to ensure the
game's long-term success. It discourages the complacency of veteran
players, who risk losing their livelihoods to players who are stronger,
faster, and hungrier for an opportunity to excel. As such, FIFA's
justifications have the game's best interests in mind.
Though FIFA's justifications for the "6+5" rule may be sound,
problems arise in determining whether the stated goals can satisfy
the proportionality requirement. To frame the issue more specifically,
the rule may be able to satisfy the adequacy element, but it is ques-
tionable whether the rule can sustain a challenge relating to suit-
ability, and doubtful that it can withstand a challenge relating to
necessity. In defining the adequacy of a new provision, the ECJ has
stated that the current situation is in need of change to protect against
possible detriments that could soon arise. 157 Applied to soccer, this
means the game is inadequate in its current state and that the "6+5"
rule is needed to facilitate its progression. This is a subjective test, as
there are innumerable ways to interpret the health of the game. One
may argue that soccer is as strong as ever based on the globalization
of the sport combined with increased revenue and exposure; another
might argue that only the "haves" contend for the best players and
the championships each year, while the "have-nots" scrap for what is
left, thus upsetting the competitive balance of the sport. Due to the
155 See Ken Foster, How Can Sport Be Regulated?, in LAW AND SPORT IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 267, 268 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2000).
156 INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 104.157 See Case C-205/99, Asociaci6n Profesional de Empresas Navieras de Lineas
Regulares (Analir) v. Administraci6n General del Estado, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1271, 1-
1280. In distinguishing between the necessity and adequacy requirements of the
proportionality test, the necessity requirement is whether the rule, as designed, is
indispensable toward bringing about the desired effects, whereas for adequacy, it is
about whether a general rule, in any form, is needed. See id
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controversial nature of this debate, deference should be given to
FIFA, given that it is the "guardian of the most cherished game."158
According to FIFA's mission statement, its objective is to "[d]evelop
the game," "touch the world," [and] "build a better future."159
Within that context, it must constantly seek ways to improve the
game and adapt to changing circumstances. Consequently, if FIFA
feels it needs to implement a rule so its mission statement can be
carried out, the adequacy component is likely fulfilled.
The "6+5" rule may be deemed adequate, but this does not
mean it is suitable or will have desirable results. The INEA Report
interprets suitable to mean only that the rule "makes a contribution to
the achievement of the objective." 160 This overly broad definition,
however, does not quite comport with the ECJ's definition. In
Commission v. Portugal, the Court found, in reference to proposed
national legislation by the Portuguese government, that a regulation
"must be suitable for securing the objective which it pursues."1 61
Nowhere does it imply that a rule or law need only make a
contribution toward achieving the purpose; if that was the case, the
suitability requirement would be much easier to meet. Thus, in deter-
mining if the "6+5" rule is suitable, the focus is on whether it would
actually achieve the stated objectives.
As previously indicated throughout this article, FIFA wants
to use the "6+5" rule to close the economic gap between rich clubs
and poor clubs in order to enhance competition and to protect
national teams by promoting the training of younger players. 162 Both
of these considerations were weighed by the Court in Bosman.163 In
addressing the economic impact of transfer fees and player quotas,
the Court stressed that neither plan really addresses or prevents the
wealthier clubs from asserting their economic influence in obtaining
158 FIFA.com, FIFA Brand - Our Commitment, http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/
federation/mission.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
159 id.
160 INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 144 (emphasis added).
161 Case C-367/98, Comm'n v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. 1-4756.
162 See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
161 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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certain players.164 The same reasoning applies to the "6+5" rule. Forc-
ing each team to comply with player quotas only serves to make the
wealthier clubs use their resources in different ways; it does not
change the fact that they have more resources. For instance, a weal-
thier club can invest more heavily in the training of junior players in
areas such as facilities, coaching, and equipment, which can attract
and produce a greater caliber of players. Furthermore, while the rule
may enhance the development of younger players, affluent clubs can
still outbid other clubs for the best players. Accordingly, it is not
entirely clear whether the "6+5" rule can actually accomplish its
objectives or whether it merely prolongs current trends in a different
form. Even in Bosman, the Court expressed concern as to whether
transfer fees and player quotas could lead to the promotion of junior
players, though it did not reach a formal decision on the matter.165 As
a result, in order to satisfy this requirement, FIFA may need to
produce some sort of empirical evidence, such as a controlled study,
to show a specific correlation between the rule and its intended
results. If FIFA can offer such evidence, it may have a chance of
overcoming this part of the proportionality test.
FIFA may be able to justify the "6+5" rule as adequate and
suitable due to the degree of difficulty in evaluating intangible fac-
tors, but its toughest challenge will be showing that the rule is
necessary to achieve its goals. The ECJ has clarified necessary to
mean "inasmuch as the same objective could not be attained by less
restrictive measures." 166 When dealing with a fundamental freedom,
such as the right of free movement of workers without being dis-
criminated against, a less restrictive option must be chosen if
possible. 167 As such, the "6+5" rule essentially needs to be indispens-
164 See Union Royale Belge des Societ~s de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995
E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-4976 to -77.
165 See id at 1-4965 to -67.
166 Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-4775.
167 Case 289/87, Proceedings for Compulsory Reconstruction against Smanor SA, 7
E.C.R. 4489, 4500 (1988) (noting that "such rules must also be proportionate to the
aim in view[;] [i]f a Member State has a choice between various measures to attain
the same objective, it should choose the means which least restrict free trade"); Case
C-320/03, Comm'n v. Austria, 2005 E.C.R. 1-9871, 1-9894 ("In order to establish
whether such a restriction is proportionate having regard to the legitimate aim
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able toward hitting its targets, especially when matched against a
fundamental freedom.
To begin this analysis, it is important to compare the current
situation with some of the earlier described case studies. In Deli~ge,
the Court found a judo association rule that potentially restricted the
freedom of services under Article 56 to be acceptable because it
constituted "a need inherent in the organisation of such a competi-
tion."1 68 In that case, the need was directly related to protecting who
could compete for the national team.169 The same cannot be said for
the "6+5" rule. Whereas the rule in Delige was narrowly tailored to
have a direct correlation with the desired results, the "6+5" rule is
more idealistic and remains speculative in terms of being able to
actually obtain its objectives. Stated differently, the "6+5" rule has a
problem with scope and, due to its general nature, has difficulty
being classified as a "need" like that espoused in Deliege. Because the
"6+5" rule is more of a desire than an actual need, 170 Deli~ge actually
works against FIFA, despite serving as an example of an instance in
which a sporting association was able to justify a rule seeming to
violate a Treaty article.
Another case that would appear to benefit FIFA on the
surface is Lehtonen. In that case, the ECJ agreed with a Belgian basket-
ball association, holding that a rule concerning transfer deadlines was
necessary to protect against late-season player additions that could
change the course of a championship race. 171 Once again, though, the
"6+5" rule is easily distinguishable from this holding. Like Deli~ge,
the rule in Lehtonen dealt with a very specific regulation with a
pursued in this case . .. it needs to be determined whether it is necessary and
appropriate in order to secure the authorised objective.").
168 Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97, Delihge v. Ligue Francophone de Judo et
Disciplines Associ~es ASBL, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2549, 1-2578 (emphasis added); see also
discussion supra Part II.C.
169 See Delikge, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-2556.170 Perhaps the rule can be classified as a future need for a gradually developing
problem, but it is difficult to reach beyond that without a more definitive timetable
and description for how and when soccer will be directly affected to the point where
a rule change in violation of a fundamental freedom is necessary.
171 See Case C-176/96, Lehtonen v. F~d~ration Royale Belge des Soci~t~s de Basket-
ball ASBL, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2681, 1-2692; see also discussion supra Part 1.C.
V. 17
(F)LINGING (I)NDISPENSABLE (F)REEDOMS (A)SIDE
confined purpose. It did not drastically alter the game like the "6+5"
rule would - in fact, it did the opposite; Lehtonen made it so the game
would not be drastically altered at the most important time of the
season. Furthermore, the Court was careful to raise the issue of neces-
sity,172 as if it was not only anticipating future challenges to certain
sporting association rules, but also warning future plaintiffs that the
burden in overcoming a fundamental freedom is still high despite the
outcome of this case. Consequently, neither Deli~ge nor Lehtonen work
to FIFA's benefit because they did not involve challenges to rules as
vast and uncertain as the "6+5" rule.
Perhaps the most important reason the "6+5" rule does not
fulfill the necessity requirement is that the rule's objectives can be
accomplished through alternative methods that sidestep the issue of
discrimination. Advocate General Lenz articulated this idea in his
Bosman opinion. In discussing less obtrusive alternatives to transfer
fees and player quotas, he comments:
Firstly, it would be possible to determine by a collec-
tive wage agreement specified limits for the salaries
to be paid to the players by the clubs .... Secondly, it
would be conceivable to distribute the clubs' receipts
among the clubs. Specifically, that means that part of
the income obtained by a club from the sale of tickets
for its home matches is distributed to the other clubs.
Similarly, the income received for awarding the rights
to transmit matches on television, for instance, could
be divided up between all the clubs.173
What Advocate General Lenz proposed are scaled salaries and reve-
nue sharing similar to that found in American sporting leagues.174
Both of these options would have the potential effect of balancing out
172 See Lehtonen, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-2698.
173 Union Royale Beige des Societ~s de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995
E.C.R. 1-4921, 1-5017 (opinion of Advocate General Lenz).
174 See Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can
Revenue Sharing Work?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 419, 421 (1995) (discussing the
effects of a salary cap and revenue sharing in American football and baseball).
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the economic disparity between certain clubs, as they would limit the
capitalist nature that currently exists and would put certain regula-
tions in place to inhibit the richer clubs and strengthen the poorer
ones. Whether one of these alternative solutions is more viable than
the other, or whether either of them would achieve the exact results
FIFA is looking for, is beyond the scope of this paper; however, they
do show there are other means to equalize competition while avoid-
ing restrictions on fundamental freedoms. Accordingly, it is in FIFA's
best interest to analyze these alternatives, which show that "less
restrictive measures" are available. As such, the "6+5" rule cannot be
shown to be indispensable, and therefore, the necessity requirement
is not met.
To summarize this section, FIFA's rationales are not the main
issue in determining whether the "6+5" rule can comply with EC law;
the problems arise when doing a proportionality analysis. The rule
can potentially survive challenges concerning adequacy and suitabil-
ity, although this is far from a sure thing and is purely speculative.
The rule likely cannot overcome the necessity requirement, because
there are ways to accomplish FIFA's goals without discriminating
against certain players. Thus, the "6+5" rule likely constitutes direct
discrimination under EC law and is illegal in its current state. Even if
FIFA can get around this restriction, the rule is still tantamount to
indirect discrimination, which likely cannot be overcome, because the
means used are not proportionate to the ends achieved.
3. A Brief Assessment of Competition Law and the "6+5"
Rule
As the Treaty-based, sports-related cases have shown, the ECJ
has been reluctant to tackle competition law under Articles 101 and
102.175 Nevertheless, it is important to focus on Meca-Medina, for it is
conceivable that the aforementioned articles could serve as another
legal barrier toward implementation of the "6+5" rule. In Meca-
Medina, the Court set forth the elements needed to establish a claim
175 Therefore, the scope of this paper does not delve into a full or complete analysis
of the competition articles either; rather, it focuses on the ECJ's decision and
reasoning in Meca-Medina and whether certain elements of it apply in relation to the
"6+5" rule.
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under Articles 101 and 102, but did not need to apply them due to the
plaintiffs' failure to supply certain evidence.1 76 Nevertheless, this
framework established by the Court can be helpful in determining
whether the "6+5" rule runs afoul of EC competition law.
Article 101 is only infringed upon if anticompetitive effects
have an impact on a substantial part of the overall market.177 Some
commentators contend that "there is a relevant market for the pur-
chase and sale of players which will be affected by the implemen-
tation of a foreign player rule."'178 The INEA Report agrees the
relevant market can be difficult to define, but argues that if the mar-
ket cannot be defined, then this provision cannot in turn be
violated. 179 Ultimately, it is unclear at this time if this Article applies
directly to the "6+5" rule,180 and the ECJ would likely do an ad hoc
analysis if a case were brought before it concerning this issue.
Similar to its neighboring provision, "Article [1021 prohibits
abuse of a dominant position by an undertaking(s) that may affect
trade between [M]ember States." 181 FIFA, as soccer's international
governing body, meets the description of a dominant undertaking,182
but as Meca-Medina shows, even rules designed for sporting reasons
by a dominant undertaking can be challenged for want of proportion-
ality.183 As such, the same proportionality test for determining if a
measure can overcome indirect discrimination - namely, if it is suit-
176 See discussion supra Part II.D.
177 See Richard Williams & Alex Haffner, FIFA Quotas Ruled Offside?, 158 NEw
L.J. 1017, 1017 (2008).
178 Id. at 1018 (arguing the "6+5" rule may run afoul of competition law principals
because it "is likely to increase the number of transfers of national players to
domestic clubs and conversely reduce the number of foreign players being
transferred.").
171 See INEA REPORT, supra note 116, at 177.I8o See Williams & Haffner, supra note 177, at 1018.
l id. at 1019.
112 Id.; Case T-193/02, Piau v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-209 (finding FIFA holds a
dominant position).
183 See Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-6991, 1-7024; see
also Williams & Haffner, supra note 177, at 1018 (establishing a "rule of reason"
doctrine similar to the one used in U.S. antitrust law cases, which allows for a
provision to overcome restrictive effects on competition if it can be shown that it is
necessary for the profession to function properly).
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able, necessary, and adequate - can apply in a competition frame-
work as well.184 This means FIFA may be required to show that the
"6+5" rule is proportional in two completely different contexts. Based
on the difficulty of showing the rule's proportionality within an
Article 45 structure, serious reservations must be raised as to whether
the rule can overcome additional Treaty articles. Consequently, the
principles of competition law are yet another obstacle that FIFA must
overcome if the "6+5" rule is to withstand legal scrutiny.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN COMPLIANCE WITH EC LAW
A. The "Homegrown Player" Rule
In May 2008, the European Commission officially approved
UEFA's "Homegrown Player" rule, which has similar objectives to
the "6+5" rule.185 In particular, UEFA's rule is designed to promote
the development of younger players, to protect the composition of
national teams, to help create more identity with local and regional
teams, and to enhance competition. 186 To accomplish this task, each
club must have at least four players on the squad who have been
registered with their current club for a minimum of three years and
are between the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. 187 Additionally, each
club must have at least four players on the squad who were once
registered with one or more clubs within the same national associa-
tion as their current club for a minimum of three years between the
ages of fifteen and twenty-one.188 As UEFA spokesperson William
Gaillard explained, "We can achieve exactly the spirit of 'six plus
five' without nationality quotas. They are just not legal within the
European Union."' 89
184 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 7, art. 101(3).
185 See Constant Brand, EU Backs UEFA 's 'Homegrown Player' Rules; Scorns FIFA
Limits on Foreign Players, AP WORLDSTREAM, May 28, 2008, available at WL,
APWORLD 11:49:07.
186 See Mark Chaplin, Homegrown Player Plans Revealed, UEFA, Feb. 3, 2005,
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind-65536/newsid-276829.html.
187 See Williams & Haffner, supra note 177, at 1017 (classifying this requirement as
"club trained" players).
1 8 See id (classifying this requirement as "association trained" players).
189 Brand, supra note 185.
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Gaillard's statement pertaining to nationality quotas marks a
crucial distinction between the "6+5" rule and the "Homegrown
Player" rule, and explains the main reason why the former rule may
be illegal, while the latter rule appears to sidestep this issue. Whereas
FIFA's rule is overtly based on nationality requirements, UEFA's rule
is more open to players of any nationality. 190 Another key distinction
is that the "6+5" rule correlates directly with a club's starting lineup,
while the "Homegrown Player" rule only concerns a club's compo-
sition.191 Thus, it is possible that the "Homegrown Player" rule could
have a minimal impact on a match, given that a squad consists of
twenty-five players and there is no obligation to play any of the eight
players subject to the quota requirements.192 Because of the lower
level of discrimination1 93 that results from the "Homegrown Player"
rule compared to the "6+5" rule, the Commission's current position
in relation to the respective rules is justified.194 One rule seems to be
"proportionate and compl[ies] with the principle of free movement of
workers, 195 while the other rule appears to be a form of direct
discrimination in violation of EC law. As such, FIFA must find a way
190 But see Briggs, supra note 23, at 451 (arguing "UEFA can thus create de facto
nationality quotas without ever using the word 'nationality,' and UEFA will argue in
support of the Homegrown Rule that it is largely nondiscriminatory in its
application.").
191 See Williams & Haffner, supra note 177, at 1017.
192 See id at 1018.
193 See id (arguing that the "Homegrown Player" rule "does not specifically place a
limitation on foreign players, but by requiring a set number of players to be 'club
trained' or 'association trained,' it is more likely to be satisfied by nationals of that
country, and therefore constitutes indirect discrimination").
194 Of note, the legality of the "Homegrown Player" rule is subject to further
evaluation in 2012 when its impact will be known to a greater extent, and the rule
will only apply to matches within the Champions League and the UEFA Cup. See id
One concern that some have with the "Homegrown Player" rule is that it will
promote child trafficking in order to find the best players that can fulfill the age
requirements of the rule. See Eur. Parl. Comm. on Culture & Educ., Draft Report on
the Future of Professional Football in Europe, at 6, PE 378.708 (Sept. 20, 2006)
(prepared by Ivo Belet), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/
2004_2009/documents/pr/631/631110/6311 10en.pdf.
195 Brand, supra note 185 (quoting Vladimir Spidla, the EU commissioner in charge
of employment matters, in response to why the Commission has endorsed the
"Homegrown Player" rule's legality).
2010
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
to circumvent the nationality restrictions it seeks to impose before its
rule can receive similar backing from the Commission.
B. Other Possibilities1 96
As previously mentioned, FIFA hopes to use the Treaty of
Lisbon as a legal foundation for implementing the "6+5" rule because
the Treaty amendment includes provisions recognizing the specificity
of sport.197 It is unclear, however, how the proposed changes relate to
fundamental freedoms, let alone whether they are strong enough to
provide a sporting organization with the necessary discretion to
override such freedoms. Given the uncertainty regarding the Treaty
of Lisbon and the doubt regarding the rule's legality based on the
current version of the Treaty, FIFA needs to be open to varying the
"6+5" rule in order to meet its objectives while not running afoul of
cherished principles.
One possible approach to varying the rule might be for
leagues to provide financial incentives to teams that play domestic
players. 198 The English Cricket Board has tried this method of encour-
aging teams to develop homegrown players, but the results have not
been successful. 199 Similarly, and perhaps more effectively, FIFA
could look at variations of the proposals set forth by Advocate
General Lenz's opinion in Bosman, which mentions structured
salaries and revenue sharing as means of improving the competitive
balance of a league.200 Ultimately, FIFA has free reign to devise its
own solution; however, it will only gain legal approval if it complies
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EC law.
196 This section mentions possible alternatives to the "6+5" rule that may achieve
similar objectives, but it does not examine the merits of such options. It is included
to illuminate that the "6+5" rule is not the only way to accomplish FIFA's desired
aims.197 See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
198 See Bruce Caldow, Six + Five ?, J. L. SOC. SCOT., June 2008, at 58, 58.
19' See id. (pointing out that "[a] soft approach based on funding may not influence
professional sports where central funding from a governing body is not sizeable in
comparison to other revenue streams.").
200 See discussion supra Part ll.B.3.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is ironic that FIFA is trying to implement the "6+5" rule - a
rule that appears to place illegal restrictions on fundamental free-
doms within EC law - when the rule appears to also be in opposition
to its own underlying values.201 As such, it is within FIFA's best
interest to adhere to the Commission's warnings and to thoroughly
examine the rule's negative impact - especially when EC law is the
obstacle - instead of just simply looking at the possible benefits. If
FIFA was to do this, it would recognize that its current proposal is
flawed and in need of tweaking, particularly in light of prior ECJ
holdings. In formulating alternative proposals, the issue is not that
the justifications are unsound, but that the methods used do not
comply with proportionality; stated differently, the means are far too
restrictive even if they could bring about the desired ends. Now is
not a time, despite growing support,20 2 for FIFA to be stubborn if it
truly wants its objectives to be achieved, as it has yet to convince the
Commission of the rule's legality. Even if it can get around this
obstacle, the ECJ would almost assuredly become involved following
the rule's implementation, as foreign players within the EU would
undoubtedly line up to challenge it.203
201 See Katherine Apps, National Discrimination in Sport: FIFA 's 6+5 Rule, SOLIC.
J., June 2008, at 18, 19 (quoting Article 3 of the FIFA Statute, which states: "Discri-
mination of any kind against a country, private person or group of people on account
of ethnic origin, gender, language, religion, politics or any other reason is strictly
prohibited and punishable by suspension or expulsion.").
202 See Charles Carrick, Fifa President Sepp Blatter Welcomes MPs 6+5 Backing,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (UK), Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/
5196105/Fifa-president-Sepp-Blatter-welcomes-MPs-support-for-65-rule.html
(stating that an English group called the Parliamentary Football Group, which
consists of 150 Members of the English Parliament, has recently endorsed the "6+5"
rule); see also Media Release, FIFA, 6+5 to be Argued in European Parliament (Apr.
24, 2009), available at http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/releases/newsid-
1051457.html#argued+european+parliament (announcing the European Parliament
will discuss the rule and specificity of sport with FIFA).
203 Given the importance of the issues at hand and their potential to have far-reaching
effects, this article takes the position that any forum court would refer the matter to
the ECJ for an interpretation of EC law. See Presentation, supra note 8 ("To ensure
the effective and uniform application of Community legislation and to prevent
divergent interpretations, the national courts may, and sometimes must, refer to the
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To conclude this article, it is only fitting to place the context
of the "6+5" dilemma in terms that even the most casual soccer fan
can understand. Basically, FIFA is playing the role of a coach; it has
crafted a well-designed play on the drawing board. However, in
game-like conditions it is unlikely that the play can be executed due
to the superiority of its opponent - EC law. Fortunately for FIFA, the
game has not reached its ending stage yet, and there is still plenty of
time remaining before the final whistle sounds. Rather, it is more like
halftime, and even though FIFA is trailing, there is still time to imple-
ment changes to the game plan. A good coach must make in-game
adjustments, and that is the challenge FIFA now faces. Currently, it is
FIFA's move, and as coach, it is free to draw up another play that it
thinks will lead to a scoring opportunity; it just needs to be weary
that the referees - the Commission and ultimately, the ECJ - are there
to uphold the rules of the game and will always be watching.
Court of Justice and ask it to clarify a point concerning the interpretation of EU law,
so that they may ascertain, for example, whether their national legislation complies
with that law.").
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